Intrusion detection mechanisms for VoIP applications by Nassar, Mohamed El Baker et al.
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
61
01
09
v1
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 18
 O
ct 
20
06
Intrusion detection mechanisms for VoIP applications
Mohamed Nassar
LORIA - INRIA Lorraine
615, rue du jardin botanique,
54602, Villers-Le`s-Nancy,
France
nassar@loria.fr
Radu State
LORIA - INRIA Lorraine
615, rue du jardin botanique,
54602, Villers-Le`s-Nancy,
France
state@loria.fr
Olivier Festor
LORIA - INRIA Lorraine
615, rue du jardin botanique,
54602, Villers-Le`s-Nancy,
France
festor@loria.fr
ABSTRACT
VoIP applications are emerging today as an important com-
ponent in business and communication industry. In this
paper, we address the intrusion detection and prevention in
VoIP networks and describe how a conceptual solution based
on the Bayes inference approach can be used to reinforce the
existent security mechanisms. Our approach is based on net-
work monitoring and analyzing of the VoIP-specific traffic.
We give a detailed example on attack detection using the
SIP signaling protocol.
1. INTRODUCTION
With VoIP we inherit the adjacent security problems asso-
ciated with the IP as well as new VoIP specific ones. Attack-
ers can profit from the vulnerabilities of the VoIP protocols
and architectures. Both Signaling protocols such as H.323
and SIP (Session Initiation Protocol), and media transport
protocols such as RTP and RTCP could be the target of
a wide set of attacks, ranging from eavesdropping, denial
of service, fraudulent usage and SPIT (Spam over internet
telephony).
Important work in both host and network intrusion detec-
tion has been already done by the industrial and academic
research community, focused in scope towards network in-
trusion detection for routing, transport and application level
protocols. However, specific approaches for VoIP are still in
an incipient stage and we were motivated in our work to
leverage existing conceptual solutions for the VoIP specific
application domain. Our paper is structured as follows: a
brief review of the possible VoIP specific threats is given in
section 2. An introduction of the Bayesian inference theory
is given in the section 3. Section 4 will present a detailed
approach of a network-based intrusion detection using a sta-
tistical Bayes model. Section 5 overviews the related works
and section 6 concludes the paper.
2. VOIP THREATS
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Although, the SIP protocol has some security capabili-
ties (like for instance to partially encrypt messages) and
thus making eavesdropping and media spamming harder,
some other threats represent real sources for major dam-
ages. The encryption of message headers is allowed, but
headers like To, From, Call-ID, CSeq and Via are impor-
tant to the proxies, such that its usage is limited. TLS can
be used for a hop by hop based encryption and end to end
encryption, non repudiation and integrity are possible via
S/MIME, but performance is heavily impacted. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs, we go through a panorama of the most
important threats.
Messages interception and call tracking. The SIP INVITE
packets contain sensible informations such as the source and
the destination of the call (To, From, Via headers), allowing
call tracking. The duration of a call can be calculated by log-
ging the time of the INVITEmessage who started the call and
the BYE message who ended it. Interception of unencrypted
SIP requests and handling of its values can be a preparatory
stage to session hijacking and man in the middle attacks.
Fraudlent usage. Malicious clients could try to bypass the
billing procedure and to make calls to the PSTN (Public
Switched Telephone Network) for free. Unsecured gateways,
misconfigured dialplans and platform specific vulnerabilities
are common causes for it.
Password cracking and user enumerating. Some attacks
attempt to break down the access control, like for instance
brute force password cracking. These attacks could be pre-
ceded by a scanning and enumeration of existing user names.
A scanner which is looking to know the valid numbers in a
domain will send a sequence of requests investigating the
location server of the domain. Each request carries a differ-
ent number or user name as destination. The scanner will
bind between the requests and the corresponding responses
to filter up the existent destinations.
Call hijacking and man in the middle attack. SIP uses
a strong authentication scheme similar to the HTTP digest.
A SIP user agent, proxy, redirect or registrar server might
challenge a client user agent to authenticate. In addition,
a user agent can challenge back a proxy server to be sure
that it also knows the shared secret. Unfortunately, only the
server authenticates the client in most VoIP implementation
and the following attack is possible: Bob wants to call Alice.
Bob’s phone sends an INVITE message to the proxy server
within its domain in order to route the call towards Alice’s
domain. Trudy impersonates the proxy and redirects the call
to its own IP address. To do so, Trudy has to create a crafted
SIP response and put its own IP address in the Contact
header. Bob’s phone does not require the authentication of
the proxy, so it accepts the response and redirects the call
to pass by Trudy’s machine. In figure 1, a normal call setup
is shown at the upper side and a scenario of call hijacking
is shown at the lower side. We do not show all the SIP
messages involved in both scenarios but just the main steps
numbered by order of appearance.
If the end to end authentication is missed -which is a com-
mon case-, man in the middle scenario is possible. A ses-
sion established between Bob and Alice could be hijacked
by Trudy. Indeed, Trudy who has caught the INVITE in the
origin of the session, copies the Call-ID, To and From tags
to a new INVITE packet and increments the sequence num-
ber CSeq. Trudy steps in and sends the crafted INVITE to
Bob or Alice. Since no authentication is required, Trudy
ends up by hijacking the session. She can change both me-
dia and signaling characteristics, like for example changing
RTP ports, adding or deleting media streams, changing the
signaling path (Via headers) or denying signaling from any
side to its benefit (Contact header).
Denial Of Service (DOS). This type of attacks aims to
affect the availability of the service. Attackers can search
for vulnerabilities in the VoIP stack of a server to find a
way to take it down using malformed packets. Otherwise,
they can fill up the available bandwidth by flooding traffic
so the server could not use the network ressources.
CANCEL and BYE attacks might take place against the
SIP call establishment procedure. If whenever someone tries
to call Bob, Trudy sends a CANCEL to Bob, then Bob will
be prevented from receiving calls. If whenever Bob tries
to make a call, Trudy sends a CANCEL to the destination,
then Bob will be prevented from making calls. Otherwise,
Trudy could send a BYE to terminate a session after a few
moments of its setup. Trudy could use proxy responses such
as 4xx(client error), 5xx(server error) or 6xx(global error) to
convince Bob that an error situation is preventing him from
making calls.
A traditional DOS can be launched against a stateful SIP
proxy or a gateway in form of a large amount of requests with
different Call-Ids. Distributed sources could participate
in the attack in order of surcharging the server capacities
(memory, CPU or bandwidth). A list of VoIP specific DOS
could be found in [12].
Attacks against gateways and voice mail servers. The
gateway between PSTN and VoIP networks is a critical point
from the billing perspective. Most often, It is the host where
the Call Detail Records (CDRs) are safeguarded and the
accounting operations are proceeded. The voice mail servers
may contain confidential informations about the customers.
For these reasons, the gateways and the mail servers are
the probable target for the hackers activities. These people
will try different kinds of host intrusions or remote code
execution and buffer overflow attacks aiming to hijack the
configuration or to tamper with the data.
SPIT or SPAM over Internet telephony. The SPAM un-
wanted messages that threaten the e-mail users will be joined
by a more annoying voice advertising. The nature of the In-
ternet protocols gives easy ways to stream real-time voice
messages to a large number of destinations. When they are
filled by automated calls, IP phones and voice-mail boxes
will be useless.
Media protocols related attacks. Modifications of the me-
dia characteristics by a media protocol is not transparent for
SIP. Actually, SIP could be classed as an out-band signaling
and does not have control mechanisms to sense a changing
in the media session. In addition, multimedia protocols such
as RTP and RTCP have their own vulnerabilities. A demon-
strative tool of the RTP play out attack was presented in [1].
The encryption of the RTP streams seems to be a good so-
lution to prevent eavesdropping, but the attackers may have
got the encryption keys by rather than a way (for instance
if the keys are negotiated clearly in the media negotiation
phase).
Supporting protocols related attacks. The ARP (Ad-
dress Resolution Protocol) poisoning attack consist in bind-
ing the physical address of the intruder with the IP address
of the gateway at the IP phone machine, and on binding the
physical address of the intruder with the IP address of the
IP phone at the gateway machine. The DNS (Domain Name
System) poisoning attack can be also used to perform man
in the middle attacks. MAC and IP spoofing are fundamen-
tal flaws in the basic Internet and could not addressed from
a particular application point of view.
Firewall traversal. The firewalls utilized with VoIP have
dynamic skills. They open and close RTP ports with re-
spect to the SDP (Session Description Protocol) parameters
during the session initiation. The firewall could be attacked
by making it dealing with a large number of port opening
requests so it may loose its defense functionality.
3. INTRODUCTION TO THE BAYES INFER-
ENCE
Bayesian methods provide a formalism for reasoning about
partial belief under conditions of uncertainty [5]. They are
based on the empirically verifiable relationship between pos-
terior(the belief we accord a hypothesis H upon obtaining
evidence e) and prior(P(H)) probabilities:
P (H/e) =
P (e/H)P (H)
P (e)
A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph whose arrows
represent causal influences and each of its nodes represents
certain knowledge and is considered to be in one of several
discrete states. In a Bayesian tree, each node might have
several children and one parent. The propagation and fusion
of the belief in a Bayesian tree are proceeded under the
following rules:
• The likelihood (or diagnostic) messages λ are travelling
upward the tree.
• The prior (or causal) messages pi are travelling down-
ward the tree.
• A child is linked to its parent by a conditional prob-
ability table (CPT) of which the elements are given
Figure 1: Normal and Attack scenarios
by:
CPTij = P (child = j/parent = i)
Each row of the matrix is a discrete distribution over
the child node states giving the parent node state and
thus it sums to 1.
• The propagation of the prior messages is given by:
pi(child) = αpi(parent) • CPT (child/parent)
where pi is a row vector and α is a constant to normalize
the distribution.
• The propagation of the likelihood messages is given by:
λto parent(child) = CPT (child/parent) • λ(child)
where λ is a column vector.
• The likelihood messages are fused together by an ele-
mentwise multiplication:
Li(parent) =
∏
child∈children(parent)
λto parenti(child)
λ(parent) is obtained by normalizing the vector
L(parent) to the unit sum.
• Finally, the belief over the states at a node is ob-
tained by an elementwise multiplication of λ(parent)
and pi(parent) and then normalizing the resulting vec-
tor by an appropriate constant β:
BELi = βpiiλi
4. BAYES MODEL TO DETECT INTRUSIVE
SIP TRAFFIC
In this section, we present the exercise of applying the
Bayes tree model into a network-based intrusion detection
solution for VoIP. The model was firstly applied in the intru-
sion detection domain as a component of the broad EMER-
ALD system to detect intrusive TCP sessions [11]. The
source of data for our detector engine is captured SIP traffic.
The packets of other VoIP protocols such as RTP or VoIP
supporting (DNS) could be also an important source of data
which could be exploited in future works.
4.1 The model structure
In our context, the source of an incoming request is the
value of the last Via header of this request, because the re-
sponse will be routed back to arrive to this address. The
destination of a request can be found in the first line of the
request. From and To headers are logical source and destina-
tion. In the following example, here.com is the SIP source
of the ACK request, and UserB@there.com is the destination.
ACK sip:UserB@there.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP ss2.wcom.com:5060;branch=721e418c4.1
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP ss1.wcom.com:5060;branch=2d4790.1
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP here.com:5060
From: BigGuy <sip:UserA@here.com>
To: LittleGuy <sip:UserB@there.com> ;tag=314159
Call-ID: 12345601@here.com
CSeq: 1 ACK
Content-Length: 0
To construct the model, choose the different variables,
study the dependency relationships between variables and
set the different parameters, a large empirical database is
needed. However, and due to our poverty to real world
traces, we have recourse to our knowledge of how SIP works
and how attacks are performed to extract a first prototype
that could be implemented to defend a VoIP site and up-
dated increasingly while new experiences are acquired by the
time.
We use a na¨ive Bayes model which is a 2-level tree formed
by one root node and several leaf nodes. The root represents
the traffic class which is unobservable. The leafs represent
the directly observable evidences. We assume that the child
nodes are conditionally independent given the parent:
P (child1/parent) = P (child1/child2, parent)
∀ child1, child2 ∈ children(parent).
The belief propagation and updating is done periodically
and we call it the inference process. The period could be con-
figured as a count of occurred events number or as a measure
of elapsed time. The events are either a SIP message cap-
tured or an exception thrown in deciphering or parsing. Dur-
ing the period time, the events update the values of variables
at the leaf nodes so at the end of each period the likelihood
messages could be estimated. While the most important in
the interpretation at the class traffic root is to distinguish
between attack and non attack cases, our model includes the
following states of interest: NORMAL, DOS, SCAN, PASS-
WORD CRACKING, FIREWALL TRAVERSAL and SPIT.
The observed variables at the leaf nodes are of three types:
Request Intensity(RI), Error Response Intensity(ERI) and Pars-
ing Error Intensity(PEI) are intensity measures, Number of
Different Destinations, Max Number of Dialogs in Waiting
State and Number of opened RTP ports are high water marks,
finally Request Distribution and Response Distribution are dis-
tribution measures. Intensity measures are exponentially
decayed counts. Noting that the codes of the SIP error re-
sponses are between 300 and 699, let I(resp code) = 1 if
300 ≤ resp code and I(resp code) = 0 otherwise. Intensity
measures are computed by the following formulas:
• RIreq = e
k∆t · RIreq−1 + 1.0 ;
• ERIresp = e
k∆t
·ERIresp−1 + I(resp code);
• PEIerr = e
k∆t · PEIerr−1 + 1.0 ;
Where ∆t is the time between the present and the immedi-
ately preceding event and k is a decay constant and is ≤ 0.
The most appropriate is to measure the time chronologically
in case of RI and by events count in case of ERI and PRI.
Like that, An exponentially decayed count does not grow
without a bound for normal behavior and well chosen de-
cay constants. We divide the intensity range into several
intervals. At each end of period, the intensity measure falls
under one interval. So, the likelihood probability is 1 for the
matched interval and 0 for all other ones.
We initiate counters to record the high water marks mea-
sures. The max number of dialog in waiting state is incre-
mented for each request which is responded but it holds the
state machine of the dialog waiting for an ACK. Once time
the ACK is received, the counter is decremented by one. The
maximum reached by the counter at any time is tracked.
Like the intensity measures, we divide the high water mark
range into several intervals and we assign appropriately the
likelihood probabilities at the end of a period. After the
inference process is finished, we reset all the counters.
Between 2 inference processes, we track the count of each
request to build up the Request Distribution. Likewise, the
responses are grouped by their respective classes and counted
to build up the Response Distribution. The distribution is
taken as the likelihood vector of the leaf node. The figure
(2) depicts the scheme of our model.
4.2 Example of the attack detection process
We aim in this section to go through the inference process
starting from a trace of attack to clarify and motivate our
approach. The calculation is not totally complete because
we have no empirical idea about the prior probabilities of the
different traffic classes so the propagation will be in only one
direction rather than two (upward).
The following trace is an example of a URI scanning (enu-
merating) attack in which the attacker tries to call 9 differ-
ent SIP URIs behind a user agent serving multiple clients.
We collect for each dialog the incoming requests from the
attacker and the outgoing responses from the user agent.
Dialog 1: INVITE → 404 Not Found → ACK
Dialog 2: INVITE → 484 Address Incomplete → ACK
Dialog 3: INVITE → 100 Trying → 503 Service
Unavailable → ACK
Dialog 4: INVITE → 100 Trying → 180 Ringing →
CANCEL → 200 0K(CANCEL) → 487 Request Terminated
→ ACK Good number, the attacker hangs up immediately.
Dialog 5: INVITE → 404 Not Found → ACK
Dialog 6: INVITE → 484 Address Incomplete → ACK
Dialog 7: INVITE → 100 Trying → 503 Service
Unavailable → ACK The number could be right but his
owner is not registered at the moment
Dialog 8: INVITE → 100 Trying → 180 Ringing → 200
OK → ACK → BYE → 200 OK Good number, the call is
answered, the attacker hangs up.
Dialog 9: INVITE → 404 Not Found → ACK
Let us first set up the CPT matrices that relates between
the root and the children nodes. Theses matrices are nor-
mally evaluated by a learning phase, but here we will set
them manually according to protocol semantics. For sim-
plicity sake, we will divide the range of each measure (except
distributions) into a few number of categories. More exper-
iments with traces of attacks will allow us in the future to
refine the number and the borders of categories. We assume
that no S/MIME encryption mechanism was in place, and
no parsing errors have occurred. The PCE is always 0 so
the related CPT has no influence on the inference process
and it is not shown. In the Request Intensity formula, we set
the decay rate at −0.35 for a half-life time of 2 seconds. To
fill up the CPT tables, we asked such kind of questions: If
the traffic is of kind DOS, what is the probability to have
RI > 10.
Request Intensity 0-10 > 10
NORMAL 1 0
SCAN 1 0
SPIT 1 0
DOS 0 1
PASSWORD CRACKING 1 0
FIREWALL TRAVERSAL 1 0
In the Error Response Intensity formula, we measure the
time as events related. We set the decay rate as −0.15 for
a half-life time near of 5 events. We set the CPT matrix to
the next:
Error Response Intensity 0-4 > 4
NORMAL 1 0
SCAN 0.2 0.8
SPIT 0.2 0.8
DOS 0 1
PASSWORD CRACKING 0 1
FIREWALL TRAVERSAL 1 0
We set the CPT matrix of the Number of Destinations to the
next:
Number of Destinations 0-7 > 7
NORMAL 1 0
SCAN 0 1
SPIT 0 1
DOS 0.8 0.2
PASSWORD CRACKING 1 0
FIREWALL TRAVERSAL 0.8 0.2
We set the CPT matrix of the Number of Opened RTP ports
to the next:
Number of Opened RTP ports 0-10 > 10
NORMAL 1 0
SCAN 1 0
SPIT 0.8 0.2
DOS 0.8 0.2
PASSWORD CRACKING 1 0
FIREWALL TRAVERSAL 0 1
Figure 2: Bayes model for SIP
We set the CPT matrix of the Max of Dialogs in Waiting
State to the next:
Max Number of Dialogs in Waiting State 0-10 > 10
NORMAL 1 0
SCAN 0.8 0.2
SPIT 1 0
DOS 0.1 0.9
PASSWORD CRACKING 0.8 0.2
FIREWALL TRAVERSAL 0.8 0.2
We restrict the Request Distribution to only INVITE(I), RE-
GISTER(R), ACK(A), CANCEL(C) and BYE(B) SIP methods.
We set the CPT matrix to the next:
Request I R A C B
NORMAL 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.10
SCAN 0.40 0.05 0.40 0.10 0.05
SPIT 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.20
DOS 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
PA. CR. 0.10 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.00
FI. TR. 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.20
The SIP responses are categorized according to their differ-
ent classes. We set the CPT matrix of the Response Distri-
bution to the next:
Request 1xx 2xx 3xx 4xx 5xx 6xx
NORMAL 0.30 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
SCAN 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.70 0.10 0.00
SPIT 0.30 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.20 0.05
DOS 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.10
PA. CR. 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.60 0.05 0.05
FI. TR. 0.30 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.20 0.05
Let us now fix the values of different variables observed at
the child nodes and then assign the likelihood probabilities.
Let us assume that the attacker launches its queries into
intervals of five seconds to give the appearance of a nor-
mal behavior. The calculus of the Request Intensity gives a
value of 2.424. The result could be justified because such
type of attack does not abnormally rise the Request Inten-
sity contrary to what a DOS attack will do. The likelihood
vector at the Request Intensity child is λ = (1 0) because
the intensity = 2.424 < 10. The likelihood vector passed to
the root node is λto parent = (1 1 1 0 1 1). The calculus
of the ERI gives a value of 2.70. The likelihood vector is
λ = (1 0) because the intensity = 2.70 < 4. The likelihood
vector passed to the root is λto parent = (1 0.2 0.2 0 0 1).
We assume that the Number of Destinations is 9 (λ = (0 1)
and λto parent = (0 1 1 0.2 0 0.2)) and that the Num-
ber of RTP ports opened is less than 10 (λ = (1 0) and
λto parent = (1 1 0.8 0.8 1 0)). We assume that each dia-
log is closed before the subsequent dialog starts. The Max
Number of Dialog in Waiting State is 1. λ = (1 0) and
λto parent = (1 0.8 1 0.1 0.8 0.8). The Request Distribu-
tion of the trace according to the SIP methods involved is
next:
method I R A C B
λ 9 0 9 1 1
λto parent = (5.6 7.35 7.4 8.1 4.5 7.4). The Response Distri-
bution of the trace according to the response classes is next:
class 1xx 2xx 3xx 4xx 5xx 6xx
λ 7 2 0 6 2 0
λto parent = (3.1 5.2 4.1 3.2 5.1 4.1).
Now we can fuse all the λto parent from children by elemen-
twise multiplication: Li =
∏
c λ to parenti(c); 1 ≤ i ≤ 6.
We obtain the vector L = (0 6.11 4.85 0 0 0). The belief
about the trace is obtained by normalizing L to the unit
sum. BEL = (0 0.56 0.44 0 0 0). The trace is either SCAN
or SPIT. This result could be explained because these two
types of attacks are very similar. To refine the scales of dif-
ferent observed variables (intensities and high water marks)
by using a greater number of intervals would better differ-
entiate between these two types.
5. RELATED WORKS
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been deployed as
a second defense line behind the intrusion prevention tech-
niques and many research papers have been written on this
topics. The conceptual building blocks of our method is the
article of Valdes and Skinner in [2].
With the deployment of web services, the designers of
IDSs recognize more and more the importance of a spe-
cific service knowledge such as implementation vulnerabil-
ities and protocol weaknesses. A service specific anomaly
detector which checks DNS and HTTP traffic is proposed in
[4]. A multi-model approach to the detection of web based
attacks has been recently published in [3].
VoIP security became a major research topic over the last
years. A general introduction to it can be found in [6]. In
[10] we find a discussion about the vulnerabilities in small
and home VoIP gateways and a proposal of some practi-
cal recommendations. Sensors at multiple layers to protect
IP telephony from DOS attacks are inspired from works on
TCP in [8]. The authors of [9] highlights the difference be-
tween the control of the SPAM email and that of SPIT.
They propose a voice SPAM control algorithm called Pro-
gressive Multi Gray-Leveling that fits in VoIP settings. In
another way, the authors of [7] propose social networks and
reputation rating to deal with SIP SPAM. More similar to
our work is the proposed intrusion detection framework de-
scribed in [13]. Our approach is different with respect to
it, since we use a Bayesian model capturing temporal and
behavioral anomalies.
6. CONCLUSION
Intrusion detection and prevention is of major importance
in VoIP networks. We have proposed in this paper an ap-
proach for VoIP intrusion detection based on prior work
done in the intrusion detection community. We have jus-
tified the security needs in the VoIP environmet by a brief
survey of the most relevant threads. The essential contribu-
tion is the modelling of SIP traffic and threat related entities
so that SPIT, enumeration and denial of service can be de-
tected. Other attacks remain still an open issue: man in
the middle and call hijacking require a different kind of se-
curity mechanisms. A complementary solution is to avoid
them, by managing the authentication and access control
infrastructure. Future work will consist in releasing an open
source based intrusion detection tool as well as performing
real world operational evaluation of our solution.
7. REFERENCES
[1] H. Abdelnur, V. Cridlig, J. Bourdellon, R. State, and
O. Festor. Voip security management. In 18th meeting
of the Network Management Research Group
(NMRG). Jul 2005.
[2] H. Javitz and A. Valdes. The SRI IDES statistical
anomaly detector. In Proceedings 1991 IEEE
Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security
and Privacy, pages 316–326. IEEE computer society,
May 1991.
[3] C. Kruegel, G. Vigna, and W. Robertson. A
multi-model approach to the detection of web-based
attacks. Computer Networks, 48(5):717–738, August
2005.
[4] C. Kru¨gel, T. Toth, and E. Kirda. Service specific
anomaly detection for network intrusion detection. In
SAC ’02: Proceedings of the 2002 ACM symposium on
Applied computing, pages 201–208, New York, NY,
USA, 2002. ACM Press.
[5] J. Pearl. Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent
Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference. Morgan
Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco, CA, USA,
1988.
[6] J. F. Ransome and J. W. Rittinghouse. VoIP security.
Elsevier Digital Press, MA, USA, Nov 2004.
[7] Y. Rebahi and D. Sisalem. Sip service providers and
the spam problem. In 2ND Workshop on Securing
Voice Over IP. http://www.vopsecurity.org/
html/voip security workshop.html 1, Washington,
DC, June 2005.
[8] Brennen Reynolds and Dipak Ghosal. Secure ip
telephony using multi-layered protection. In
Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium(NDSS). The Internet Society,
2003.
[9] D. Shin and C. Shim. Voice spam control with gray
leveling. In 2ND Workshop on Securing Voice Over
IP. http://www.vopsecurity.org/
html/voip security workshop.html 1, Washington,
DC, June 2005.
[10] P. Thermos and G. Hadsall. Vulnerabilities in soho
voip gateways. In 2ND Workshop on Securing Voice
Over IP. http://www.vopsecurity.org/
html/voip security workshop.html 1, Washington,
DC, June 2005.
[11] A. Valdes and K. Skinner. Adaptive, model-based
monitoring for cyber attack detection. In RAID ’00:
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on
Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, pages 80–92,
London, UK, 2000. Springer-Verlag.
[12] VoIPSA. Voip security and privacy threat taxonomy.
Public Realease 1.0, Oct 2005.
http://www.voipsa.org/Activities/VOIPSA_Threat_Taxonomy_0.1.pdf
1.
[13] Y. Wu, S. Bagchi, S. Garg, N. Singh, and T. K. Tsai.
Scidive: A stateful and cross protocol intrusion
detection architecture for voice-over-ip environments.
In International Conference on Dependable Systems
and Networks (DSN 2004), pages 433–442. IEEE
Computer Society, Jun 2004.
1URLs are last explored on Feb 27, 2006
